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1. From Nietzsche to Heidegger: the reversal of Platonism
Nietzsche’s “reversal of Platonism” program was pursued in dierent
ways and along many routes in twentieth Century philosophy. One of
its core tendencies is the problematic relationship between the concept
of “truth” and the gure of “mask”. As Nietzsche says the “secret” of
Platonism, i. e. its philosophical core and its undeclared presupposition,
is hidden in the bond between two instances, truth and mask. This
relationship was investigated by French philosophers in post-war times,
with particular regard to the role played by iconic platonic gures
such as eidos, idea, eikon and eidolon. The problematic connection
among these gures expresses one of the main diculties of platonism:
how must the relationship between concept and reality be conceived?
Plato’s allegories such as light/shadow, original/image, model/copy
give some indications, but certainly do not provide an ultimate solution.
Following Nietzsche’s footsteps, thinkers such as Foucault, Ricoeur,
Deleuze, Mattei, Nancy and Derrida among others, deepened the prob-
lematic status of these concepts in Plato in order to uncover what
they thought the hidden core of platonism is. Inspired by both Ni-
etzsche’s and Heidegger’s criticism of Western philosophy’s meta-
physical ground, these thinkers undertake what will later be called
“deconstruction” of Platonism. At the center of this lies the will to un-
mask platonism as a complex strategy of manipulation and protection.
What Platonic philosophical system tries to protect is the concealed
foundation of political power through philosophy by posing an ab-
solute reality (the Good) which justies every tension to truth but
remains structurally unattainable. Every human production should
be considered an approximation of the perfect reality of the Good
which solely through philosophy can briey be touched and partially
conveyed to others. Within this frame, Plato’s use of truth-image rela-
tion emerges in many of these authors as a problematic feature that
must be emphasized in order to check Plato’s claim to a philosophical
foundation.
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According to Nietzsche,1 Truth has a twofold structure: 1. a su-
percial structure which consists in the possibility for Truth to assert
itself against masks, alterations, falseness and all claims represented by
the so-called “apparent knowledge”. But in actual fact this relationship
between truth and mask structurally determines the essence of truth
in a much deeper way. According to Nietzsche Truth is a mask in itself.
Because it is a disguise that conceals the unconfessable scopes which
lie behind the surface of the pure search for the truth. The instance of
truth as something that is wanted for the sake of itself is the disguise
of a well-hidden scope: domination, imposition, strife for power.2 A
hint of this is the identication of the True with the Good, that is with
something which is structurally bound to an act of will. It is to a will
that the Good appears as something which is worth striving for, as a
value. In denouncing the contradictory nature of a value so conceived
(something which is subjectively posed as something objectively valid),
what collapses is the very possibility of the position of an absolute,
and so what declines is the legitimacy of the realm of Truth, Being
and God. The analysis of the inner structure of Truth in its connection
to the instance of disguise is thus the ground for the possibility of a
reversal which concerns the whole metaphysical traditon since Plato.
So Nietzsche. Out of this basis, from Gilles Deleuze3 onward French
philosophy will deepen this intuition about the self-reversing relation-
ship between truth and mask in platonism and about the dynamics
of power concealed in it. Such an evolution would never have been
possibile without the intertwining of Nietzsche’s position with Martin
Heidegger’s project of an “overcoming of Metaphysics” and in par-
ticular with the role played by his notion of “ontological dierence”.
How do these two components work together along the perspective
designed by French criticism of platonism in the twentieth century?
Essentially in two ways. First, what is held is the truth-mask game, but
that takes place by qualifying this game with the self-concealing struc-
ture which animates Heidegger’s concept of “Being” as “Dierence”,
that is by submitting it to a radical internal necessity.
1. See on this Nietzsche 1999.
2. See on this Glenn 2004.
3. On Deleuze’s reading of Platonism see Deleuze 1994.
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According to Heidegger, Plato himself was the rst who, in his
dialogues, pointed out the direction of the possible reversal of his
system. Heidegger thought the possibility of the reversal is structurally
contained in the main core of Platonism and led to the conclusion
that Platonism is in its essence the dynamic of a reversal, precisely
of the constant inversion between truth and concealing. The truth-
mask connection is then read as a necessary historical process, thus
submitted to the instance of time. The continuous passage from truth
to concealing and backwards is therefore read as a movement that
ows in time, the ontological movement of deferring, which is called
deferral.4
Out of this scenery it is possible to place Deleuze and Derrida,
among others, at the crossing between the positions of Nietzsche and
Heidegger so described. Of course this is achieved by skipping the
numerous other instances which play a role in the bulding of their
positions. What determines this crossing is the reading of the internal
relationship between truth and disguise/concealing as a movement of
dierence (Deleuze) and deferral (Derrida) that expresses itself in time.
2. Gilles Deleuze’ repetition of Platonism
It was Deleuze the rst to think that this movement could be identied
as the necessity for truth to produce images, copies and simulacrums
of itself.5 What is essentially truth, wisdom, knowledge? According to
Deleuze (like Nietzsche), truth is originally a political force, an instance
of domination, of gain and preservation of some kind of power. As a
matter of fact, the notion of Truth expresses the possibility to establish
a hierarchy between the various claims to wisdom; the possibility to
select among them and to set an order. Truth expresses the necessity
of a series of degrees in the movement of approaching to a rst, an
origin. But according to Deleuze this “rst” has no consistence in
itself, since it is arbitrarily generated only to give legitimacy to the
possibility of a hierarchy. Rather than being the opposite of the mask,
truth becomes the disguise for the instance of selection that could make
4. On the gure of “dierence” as keyword for Heidegger’s reading of Plato’s
metaphysics see Le Moli 2002.
5. See on this Deleuze 1983. orig, in Deleuze 1969. Now also in Deleuze 2004.
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peace between the many pretenders to wisdom. A political strategy
thus lies at the very heart of Platonism.
Deleuze argues it by analyzing the role that Plato confers to the
notions of image, copy and simulacrum in their relation to the truth.
According to its very notion, Truth is a movement of selfrevealing that
occurs in time. What is (or was) originally true can never be attained in
its pure origin, in its belonging to a past. It can only be reconstructed,
remembered, repeated as it once was. The platonic description of the
status of an idea gives structure to this notion of Truth. As idea, Truth
needs to be repeated in order to obtain its identity. But the shifting
of time causes the paradoxical consequence that the repetitions of an
idea are dierent from the original one, just like every reconstruction
of Truth, even the most accurate, remains in its essence dierent from
what has really happened.
Deleuze’s thesis is that the necessity for truth to produce images
in order to keep itself identical exposes the truth to a movement of
dierence that consumes it right from the start. Even for Plato, Truth
in its pureness is declared unattainable. What men pursue is a so-
called “second sailing” that departs from the images instead of looking
directly into the origin. Men belong to the realm of images, they move
in it trying to make out the images that can give them the second best
access to the truth they have always lost.
A political feature thus seems to rule the notion of deuteros plous.
Images are subjected to truth, are in its service, but in the way that
they are produced as a reminder that a truth has once been. According
to Deleuze, this appears out of the fact that in the Platonic view images
can also divert from truth, they can deceive and mislead men from the
right path. They can even be used to deny the very possibility of truth
instead of pointing at it. This means an image is the opening of a space
in which one can decide to follow the truth or revolt against it.
This is what the sophist does, in Plato’s description. What makes a
sophist dierent from a philosopher is the dierent use of the images
in their power to recall a Truth. A sophist uses images to lead away
from the truth. Aristotle refers to this alternative as a proairesis tou
biou, a choice that concerns one’s own way of life. The formation of
an image is thus the opening of a space of freedom in which what
dierentiates the philosopher from the sophist is the ethical decision
about the possibility to recall a lost truth.
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According to Deleuze, then, the copies’ ability to deceive and the
explicit foundation of knowledge upon Ethics, allow this hidden struc-
ture to emerge. Copies and images are distant from the truth, but they
can recall it, evoke its lost presence. This may arouse the suspicion that
truth exists only as a pole generated from the movement of dierence,
as something to which an image should structurally be referred. This
movement activates itself when something that we previously held
as a real thing is now conceived as image of something else, that is
when it expresses a power of signicance that overcomes its status
of self-consistent being. In this way what can be observed is not the
presence existence of beings, truths and objective knowledges, but
only a movement of constant shifting from things out of their ability
to become signs, to lose their status of present beings and be deferred,
exposed to the movement of dierence.
3. The poisoning (of) Platonism: Jacques Derrida
Jacques Derrida too sees the truth-image pair as an optimal observa-
tion point to uncover the problematic core of Platonism. Two texts,
which in their sequence form a large part of Derrida’s book Dissemina-
tion (1972),6 describe Derrida’s deconstructive attitude towards these
concepts in Plato. The rst, Plato’s Pharmacy (1968), stems from an
analysis of Plato’s Phaedrus. The second one, The double session (1970),
reads in its rst part a section of Plato’s Philebus as a conrmation of
the previous text’s critical conclusion.
In these texts the notion of “image” carries a phenomenological fea-
ture which must be emphasized. According to Derrida a new relevance
must be given to the physical, material aspect of an image. What is at
work in the formation of an image is a translation of something ideal
in terms of time and matter. This translation follows the physical law
of an inscription act and can then be conceived as a “writing” process.
Derrida’s point of departure from Plato’s Pharmacy is therefore the
platonic criticism of writing as a means to gain knowledge. According
to Plato writing neither contain, nor can excite any real knowledge.
Knowledge is dened as a living speech (logos) of the soul with itself.
What is written (gramma) is no longer alive. What is written cannot
6. Derrida 1972 as Derrida 1981.
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be questioned because it will not answer anymore. It doesn’t utter any
sound, has lost the lively power of phone, which, at this stage of Plato’s
opinion, is the direct expression of the living thought.
What Plato seems to build in the Phaedrus is then, once more,
a hierarchy that departs from the living thinking, which occurs in
the present of one’s life, and goes through the articulated voice and
speech to convey its contents to oneself or to others. Voice and speech
would then be direct expression or sign-substitute (symbolon) of one’s
present thoughts. What is written shall no longer have anything more
of the living force that moves actual thought. Written speech does not
belong to anyone in particular, it can be repeated, copied, pronounced
by someone dierent to the one whose thoughts were “originally”
expressed in it. This lack of life is what makes writing akin to painting
(Phaedrus, 275 D). Both are inadequate reproduction forms (mimesis) of
something that once was lively and real. Painted gures cannot move,
as written discourse bears only an apparent resemblance to someone’s
living thought. blance to someone’s living thought.
But the criticism of writing as “dead letter” is only one side of
the complex Platonic position towards images. Within the Platonic
conception of image lies the “secret” (so again Derrida) of metaphysics
as the origin of the process of signication. Derrida’s point is that the
truth-image nexus is the root of the very possibility of metaphysics.
The recognition of something as image represents indeed the birth
of the signication process in which something gains a referential,
dierential value that it does not have when conceived as present
being. In being seen as image it becomes signicant, which means it is
dispossessed of its own reality and submitted to a relation of deferral.
As an image, its main ontological feature is no longer its own essence
as material thing, for example, but its reference to something else, its
function as visible reproduction of an absent model. The opening of
such a dierential space which dispels any presence brings out the
eventuality that the signication will not work, or that it will work in
a deceptive way, producing mere resemblance of signication. Thus
in Plato the need emerges for a criterion which allows to dierentiate
between a nexus of signication which is eectively working and one
which only apparently works, deceiving those who are not skilled in
distinctions. Plato will then distinguish between the case of something
that is recognized as an image because it carries a clear reference
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to something else, and the case of an image which can conceal this
reference, deceiving the observer and pretending to be something
signcant on its own.
Once more what thus emerges is an instance of selection. A hi-
erarchical drive seems to bring Plato to the nal distinction between
a good way of making images and a bad way. The criterion serves
to guarantee the existence of a special type of image: one that can
eectively lead to the truth, thus making the process of signication a
working and legitimate distinction of two realms of being.
According to Derrida, the alternative between the good and the
bad image in Plato is a real one, i. e. it is the eective possibility to
choose between one option or the other. The two alternatives are
both experience belonging to a same order of the absence of an origin.
That happens because, as one might deduce from many clues in Plato
(the theory of knowledge of the Theaetetus included) truth presents
itself as already lost. Plato interpretes not only the written speech as
something detached from the original pureness of truth, but also living
voice and actual thinking as something which is inscribed, written
in the physical substratum of memory. Plato describes everything
that pertains to the realm of human soul (thought, voice, memory) as
something already deferred, originally shifted from the actual pureness
of truth. According to its notion, truth happens in the present. It
happens and happens without losing its pureness, maintaning itself in
the sphere of an eternal present. But all faculties of the human soul
are originally left out from this realm of eternal presence. They pursue
their lives in the running of time. The contents of memory are present
reminders of past thoughts, the sounds of the voice are present symbols
of past memories, the written logos is a current and material reminder
of the sounds of a lost voice. And so on.
As described in the Philebus, memory, the rst inscription in the
soul, starts the corruption of a supposed original pureness of the truth.
The consistence of truth reveals itself, at the end of the deconstruction,
derived from the movement of signication, from the deferral that
makes written logos shifting from itself towards a living voice that
should be its root. The spoken voice shifting from itself towards a
living thought that comes from a previous impression on memory, and
so on.
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The supposed present pureness of truth thus derives from the
hermeneutical gesture that reads something present as image of some-
thing past, as a trace. In the process of signication something loses
its own being, is deferred to something else which, from this time on-
wards, will be deemed as its lost matrix. The recognition of an image
represents the birth of the signication process in which something
gains a referential value. This process does not have a beginning. It
happens continuosly and has always happened.
In Derrida’s reading of Plato, Metaphysics is both the recognition
of men’s living functions as inscribed in this signication space and
the eort (or the will) to anchor this eternal ow to a rst, a principle.
But the continuous gesture which opens the space of signication
by overcoming the simple presence of a being subdues this eort
to a law which disavows its claims. According to this law simple
presence, Being, is a condition which needs to be overcome to make our
signication devices working: thought, memory, voice and speech. In
letting the root of the signication emerge, Metaphysics thus converts
itself in its opposite. Rather than being the ultimate demonstration of
the existence of ideas as the eternal essences of things, Metaphysics
reveals the notion of “eternal presence” as something which structurally
needs to be left behind to let the signication process work. In this self-
reversal of Metaphysics even the ideas – for Plato the eternal causes of
everything – are shown as something caused, eects of the movement
of dierence.
4. Conclusion
We can now interrupt this reconstruction. Much could be said (and
much has been said) about the limits of the Deconstruction and the
legitimacy of its claims. But still it is not strange that in many ways this
criticism seems to work eectively on our comprehension of Platonism
as historical experience. Perhaps this “apparent ticking” is based on
something solid, albeit problematic. According to Derrida the reason
why this “suspicion structure” claims to be working on Plato’s thinking
is that since its origins, Metaphysics has had something to do with it.
By studying the birth of Philosophy until Plato, Derrida may repute
Metaphyiscs is a suspicion structure as well. A suspicion cast on the
ordinary world, on the realm of what was later – after Metaphysics
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– called “the world of appearences” (phenomena). Following Derrida,
Metaphysics may in rather a convincing manner be conceived as the
instauration of the space of signication, the opening of a hiatus - and
so of a connection - between two worlds. This would actually happen
in Plato by seeing something no longer in itself but as sign, image,
trace of something that - here the intervention of Derrida - oers itself
only as pole of the deferring relation, i. e. nds its consistence in the
dierence and never as present being. One may dispute the soundness
of this last argument, but cannot deny that, in diverting the natural
attitude towards experience in the search for a principle which shall lie
beyonds and cannot be grasped by senses, Metaphysics justies with
some plausibility the hypothesis to be “the root of every suspicion”.
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